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Abstract
How do I know the person I see in the mirror is really me? Is it because I know the person simply looks like me, or is it
because the mirror reflection moves when I move, and I see it being touched when I feel touch myself? Studies of face-
recognition suggest that visual recognition of stored visual features inform self-face recognition. In contrast, body-
recognition studies conclude that multisensory integration is the main cue to selfhood. The present study investigates for
the first time the specific contribution of current multisensory input for self-face recognition. Participants were stroked on
their face while they were looking at a morphed face being touched in synchrony or asynchrony. Before and after the visuo-
tactile stimulation participants performed a self-recognition task. The results show that multisensory signals have a
significant effect on self-face recognition. Synchronous tactile stimulation while watching another person’s face being
similarly touched produced a bias in recognizing one’s own face, in the direction of the other person included in the
representation of one’s own face. Multisensory integration can update cognitive representations of one’s body, such as the
sense of ownership. The present study extends this converging evidence by showing that the correlation of synchronous
multisensory signals also updates the representation of one’s face. The face is a key feature of our identity, but at the same
time is a source of rich multisensory experiences used to maintain or update self-representations.
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Introduction
The question of self and identity lies at the heart of human
psychology. Experimental research on the physical aspects of self
[1] has focused on two domains: self-face recognition, and body-
ownership. Even though our physical sense of self is jointly
constituted by our physical appearance, of which the face is
perhaps its most distinctive feature, and by our sensory-motor
body, there has been no direct research link between these two
main aspects of selfhood, face and body. Research on self-face
recognition has focused on the retrieval of visual representations of
one’s face [2], while research on body-recognition has investigated
how current sensory inflow interacts with motor signals and body-
representations [3]. Both research traditions have advanced our
understanding of self-face and self-body representations respec-
tively, even though, to date, the interaction between the two has
not been investigated. How do I know the person I see in the
mirror is really me? Is it because I know the person looks like me,
as accounts of visual face perception might suggest, or is it because
the mirror reflection moves when I move, and I see it being
touched when I feel touch myself, as accounts of body-recognition
imply? Or is it a combination of both, and how is this combination
determined? Face-recognition studies suggest that visual recogni-
tion of stored visual features [4–6] and configurations [7] inform
self-face recognition. In contrast, body-recognition studies con-
clude that multisensory integration is the main cue to selfhood [8–
12]. However, the evidence used in one domain (i.e. body-
recognition) may have an unrecognized importance in the other
(i.e. self-face recognition). Thus, multisensory evidence for selfhood
is widely recognized for bodies, but it may also be important for
self-face recognition.
Cognitive psychology has provided detailed accounts of the main
principles of face processing, especially when perceiving other
people’s face, such as hierarchical processing [13], holisitic vs. part
processing [14], and processing of identity vs. changeable aspects of
faces [15]. However, research on self-face recognition has focused
mostly on its neural substrates, especially on the right hemisphere
[16–20], rather than on the underpinning cognitive processes. The
few studies looking at thecognitive processing inself-facerecognition
emphasize either the presence of view-invariant representations of
one’s face [7], or the role of mnemonic representations of one’s face
(e.g. mirror-image) that argue against the existence of robust self-face
representations [4–6]. Interestingly, the only study looking at self-
recognition errors in everyday life [21], reports that approximately
halfofthenormalparticipantstested hadatleastoncetheexperience
of judging their own face in a mirror or photograph as being the face
of someone else. Previous studies on self-face recognition have been
largely based on the influence of visual recognition of stored visual
features and visual configurations that derive from the perception of
other people’s faces. These features and configurations are usually
onlyavailableforour ownfacewhen using mirrors.When welook in
a mirror we are usually moving or touching the face, and therefore
there are multiple proprioceptive, tactile, motor as well as visual
sensory cues which are likely to be strong cues to self-recognition.
This hypothesis derives from a large body of evidence showing how
multisensory signals update cognitive representations of one’s body,
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body [12], the physical appearance of one’s body [24] and the sense
of agency [11,25]. For example watching a rubber hand being
touched synchronously as one’s own unseen hand generates the
feeling that the rubber hand is part of one’s body [9,22–23].
Asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation between the two hands does
not elicit the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI). This paradigm suggests
that multisensory evidence can be used to produce a sense of self.
The present study formally investigates, for the first time, the
specific contribution of multisensory stimulation for self-face
recognition by using synchronous or asynchronous visuo-tactile
stimulation on the face to assess the extent to which current
multisensory inflow may interact with and alter self-face
recognition. Participants watched a morphed face being touched
on the cheek with a paintbrush, as if they were looking in a mirror,
for 120 sec. The morphed face contained a blending of the
participant’s facial features (50%) with the features of someone
else’s face (50%). While participants were looking at the morphed
face being touched, the experimenter touched their face with an
identical paintbrush in synchrony or asynchrony on the same
location (see Methods, and Figure 1). Before and after the
exposure to this multisensorial combination of felt touch and vision
of touch, participants performed a self-face recognition task [17].
Participants watched movies that contained the whole morphing
sequence in 1% morphing transitions, either from other to self (i.e.
from 0% self to 100% self), or from self to other (i.e. from 100%
self to 0% self, see Figure 1a). They were instructed to stop the
movie when they felt that the face was starting to look more like
self than other, or vice versa, depending on the morphing direction
displayed in the movie. The points at which the participants
stopped the movies were used to calculate the percentage of frames
that were judged as belonging more to the participants’ own face
across conditions (see Figure 2). The analysis focused on the
differences in the chosen points at which participants stopped the
movie before and after their exposure to multisensory stimulation.
Results
The mean values (see Table 1) were submitted to a 26262
ANOVA, with the factors of direction of morphing (i.e. from self to
other, or from other to self), the mode of visuo-tactile stimulation
(synchronous or asynchronous), and the judgment (pre- or post-
test). The main effect of direction of morphing (F(1,11)=125.44
p,0.05), of stimulation (F(1,11)=10.46 p,0.05) and judgment
(F(1,11)=13.71 p,0.05) were significant. The two-way interaction
between judgment and direction was not significant (F(1,11)=1.8,
p.0.05). The two-way interaction between direction and
stimulation was not significant (F(1,11)=.33, p.0.05). Important-
ly, the two-way interaction between judgment and stimulation
(F(1,11)=17.93, p,0.05) was significant, while the three-way
interaction (i.e. direction6judgment6stimulation, F(1,11)=1.88
n.s.) was not significant.
The main effect of morphing direction was highly significant as
noted above. In the ‘‘self to other’’ direction, participants stopped
the movie after 44 frames on average, while in the ‘‘other to self’’
direction, they stopped the movie after 62 frames on average.
Thus, participants stopped the movie earlier when they had to
judge if the face looked more like other , and they stopped the
movie later when they had to judge if the face looked more like
self. Even though, the two morphing directions yielded statistical
differences, the observed pattern is consistent with less than 50%
of frames being ‘‘classified’’ as belonging to self across both
conditions (44 frames for ‘‘self to other’’, and 38 frames in the
‘‘other to self’’). The pre-tests in the main experiment show a trend
to judge the seen face as looking more like the other than self. This
bias may reflect a bias in self-recognition that has been previously
Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the morphing procedure and the direction of morphing (from ‘‘self to other’’ or from ‘‘other to self’’)
displayed in the two types of movies (Fig 1a), and the experimental set-up during the visuo-tactile stimulation (Fig 1b).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004040.g001
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a more general familiarity bias. Both the main experiment and the
control experiment (see below) suggest that participants are
particularly sensitive to changes in familiar faces. However, the
important finding of the present study is that synchronous
stimulation significantly reduces this bias, even if the average
frame in post-tests after synchronous stimulation contains
objectively more self than other. Because it is only the 2-way
interaction between judgment and stimulation that is significant, it
seems unlikely that the main effect of morphing direction can
account for the differences between pre- and post judgment for
each level of visuo-tactile stimulation.
Planned comparisons between pre and post-test judgments
showed that synchronous but not asynchronous stimulation
resulted in a significant change in the self-recognition judgments
when participants saw the ‘‘self to other’’ morphing (t(11)=2.6,
p,0.05, 2-tailed), the ‘‘other to self’’ morphing (t(11)=2.95,
p,0.05, 2-tailed), and also when we compared the mean values
collapsed across the two morphing directions (t(11)=4.27, p,0.05
2-tailed). Differences between the pre-test and post-tests with
asynchronous stimulation were not significant for any morphing
direction (t(11)=1.1, p.0.05 , t(11)=1.2, p.0.05 and t(11)=1.7,
p.0.05 respectively).
In a follow-up analysis, the shifts in self-face recognition as a result
of multisensory stimulation were estimated as the difference between
judgments in the post-test and the judgments in the pre-test across
the synchronous and asynchronous stimulation conditions. Planned
comparisons revealed significant differences between synchronous
and asynchronous shifts for the ‘‘self to other’’ direction of morphing
(t(11)=2.3, p,0.05, 2-tailed), the ‘‘other to self’’ direction of
morphing (t(11)=2.5, p,0.05, 2-tailed), and also when we
compared the mean shifts across conditions (t(11)=4.2, p,0.05, 2-
tailed). This analysis confirms the hypothesis that it is not the mere
presence of multisensory stimulation that alters self-face recognition,
but instead it is only the synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation that
changes self-face recognition over and above the mere presence of
visual and tactile stimulation.
To ensure that this effect was self-specific and not simply due to
the presence of synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation, 6 new
participants performed a control experiment in which their own
face was replaced by the face of a highly familiar face across all
phases of the experiment. Participants completed two synchronous
and two asynchronous blocks with the same methods as in the
main experiment, apart from the fact that the participants’ own
face was replaced by the face of a highly familiar face across all
phases of the experiments, while the other face was that of an
unfamiliar person. The points at which the participants stopped
the movie were used to calculate the percentage of frames that
were judged as belonging more to the familiar face across
conditions (46.5%62.3 S.E.M. for pre-test/asynchronous,
47.1%61.8 S.E.M. for post-test/asynchronous, 47.4%62.3
S.E.M. for pre-test/synchronous and 47.4%62.1 S.E.M. for
Figure 2. Figure 2 shows the mean % of frames for which the face was perceived to look more like ‘‘self’’ (white bars) or more like
‘‘other’’ (black bars). The areas coloured in red represent the percentage of additional frames that were attributed to the ‘‘self’’ as a result of the
synchronous or asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004040.g002
Table 1. The mean % of frames where the face was perceived to look more like ‘‘self’’ than ‘‘other’’ across conditions.
‘‘Other to self’’ ‘‘Self to other’’ Grand Mean
Pre-test Post-test Pre-test Post-Test Pre-Test Post-test
Asynchronous Stimulation 36.8% (1.1) 38.2% (1.1) 43.2% (0.5) 44.1% (0.5) 40.0% (0.7) 41.2% (0.6)
Synchronous Stimulation 36.4% (1.2) 44.3% (1.7) 43.9% (0.9) 47.0% (1.2) 40.1% (0.5) 45.7% (1.1)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004040.t001
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were significant (F(1,5)=.44, p=.53 for the type of stimulation,
F(1,5)=.38, p=.56 for the judgment, and F(1,5)=.13, p=.72 for
the interaction). The results revealed no significant changes in the
recognition task as an effect of synchronous stimulation, suggesting
that the observed effect in the main experiment cannot be
accounted simply by face-familiarity.
The participant’s subjective experience was not systematically
assessed with questionnaires after each block to avoid suggestibil-
ity. During informal debriefing at the end of the experiment, some
participants reported that during synchronous stimulation they felt
as if they were looking at a mirror but not seeing exactly their own
face (n=5), or that they were looking themselves at the mirror
(n=2), or a video (n=2), or that the experience was uncanny in
the sense that the touch they felt matched exactly the touch they
saw on a face that ‘‘was, and at the same time wasn’t’’ their own
face (n=2). When asked about the difference between synchro-
nous and asynchronous stimulation, participants reported that the
experience of touch on their own face was more salient in the
synchronous conditions (n=5), and that the synchronicity of the
two events established a ‘‘strong link’’ between the face on the
screen and their own face (n=4). For the asynchronous condition,
participants felt that the touch they saw on the screen would
predict the touch on their face (n=7), or that the two events were
not related (n=4). One participant opted out of debriefing.
Overall, the behavioral results of the main experiment show that
after synchronous stimulation, participants accepted as self-stimuli,
faces that were significantly more morphed towards the other
person than those accepted after asynchronous stimulation. Faces
containing an average 5.6% more of someone else’s face were
judged as ‘self’ after synchronous stimulation compared to before
(see Figure 2). This pattern reflects a statistically significant shift in
the internal representation of one’s own face, due to synchronous
visual-tactile stimulation.
Discussion
This experiment investigated for the first time how current
multisensory inflow may interact with, and possibly alter self-face
representations. The results suggest that a strong correlation
between synchronous visual and tactile signals influences self-face
recognition over and above the mere presence of multisensory
stimulation, and it may alter internal representations of one’s own
face, analogous to the effects of multisensory stimulation for body-
ownership. Synchronous multisensory stimulation can update
cognitive representations of one’s body, such as the sense of
ownership of body-parts [9,25] or whole body [12], and the
physical appearance of one’s body [24]. The present study extends
this converging evidence by showing that multisensory signals also
update the representation of one’s face.
A recent review highlights both similarities and differences in the
way we process faces and bodies [26]. While, detection of faces and
bodies is underpinned by distinct cortical areas, presumably because
it depends on the recruitment of basic visual categorization
processes, recognition of faces and bodies requires more complex
processes such as configural analysis and identification. Face- and
body-perception are consistently linked to activity in the fusiform
face area [27] and the extrastriate body area [28] respectively, while
recognition of one’s face or body is often linked to multisensory
areas, predominantly on the right hemisphere. Accumulating
neuroimaging data report activations in the insular and parietal
cortices associated with body-ownership [23,29], agency [30–31]
and self-face recognition [32–33], suggesting that all these aspects of
the self may share a partially common neural substrate in the right
hemisphere. Interestingly, the few case studies of delusional
misidentification (for a review see [34]) following focal brain lesions
report lesions in the right hemisphere. In terms of the underlying
cognitive deficits of delusional misidenification, different accounts
have been suggested in the literature, such as prosopagnosia, mirror
agnosia, disordered facial body schema, impaired facial processing
and visuso-perceptual deficits. More recently, hypnotic suggestion
was successfully used to induce delusional mirrored-self misidenti-
fication in healthy volunteers, suggesting that top-down processes
may also underlie self-identification [35].
Interactions between seeing one’s own face and multisensory
stimulation have also been reported previously. For example,
seeing one’s own face being touched enhances tactile perception
on the face [36]. In addition, being exposed to one’s own odour, or
seeing/hearing one’s own name has been shown to facilitate self-
face recognition [37]. However, these previous studies did not
investigate the role of crossmodal facilitations or multisensory
stimulation for maintaining or updating a representation of one’s
face. The present study shows that a shared multisensory
experience may update the internal representation of one’s face,
in the same way that multisensory stimulation in the rubber hand
illusion may update the internal representation of the physical
appearance of one’s own hand. A recent study [24] shows that
incorporation of the rubber hand into the body image affects the
similarity that participants perceived between their own hand and
the rubber hand. Specifically, participants’ similarity ratings were
correlated with the subjective experience that the rubber hand was
becoming more like their own hand, but not the converse [24, see
also 38]. In a similar way, the results on self-face recognition also
point to the same direction of change because after synchronous
multisensory stimulation participants accepted as self-stimuli faces
that were more extensively morphed. Such changes in the
perceived similarity of body parts reported in that study and of
faces as reported in this study may explain the ways in which self-
representations are constructed and updated.
Ontogenetically, the existing evidence on self-recognition
suggests that an implicit bodily sense of self appears before explicit
self-face recognition in the mirror (see ‘‘the rouge task’’ [39]).
Newborn infants can discriminate between endogenous and
exogenous tactile stimulation, and by the 3rd month, infants can
detect visuo-proprioceptive incongruencies [40]. Explicit mirror
self-recognition occurs between months 14th–18th [39]. There-
fore, an implicit body-awareness that depends on the efficient
integration of multisensory signals precedes the explicit recognition
of one’s face in the mirror that seems to be constructed by the
assimilation of congruent multisensory signals. In addition,
multisensory signals can also be used to update self-representations
by assimilating external events into a pre-existing body image
[24,38]. The changes induced as a result of multisensory
experience affect mainly the representation of one’s self and body
in relation to other people or bodies. It is therefore plausible that
even when we feel physically dissimilar to each other, shared
multisensory experiences can make us feel to be more similar. As
recent developmental models suggest [41–42], a basic ‘‘like me’’
process whereby percepts of other people’s actions, appearance
and identity are interpreted in terms of one’s own actions,
appearance and identity, may form the basis of intersubjectivity
and social cognition. Other situations such as joint action [43], and
automatic imitation [44] also provide multisensory inputs that are
comparable with the inputs used in the RHI and the present study.
Future studies can actively exploit such experimental paradigms to
investigate whether changes in self-representations can be followed
by specific changes in the way we perceive other people with
whom we share multisensory experiences.
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accompanied by a continuous integration of tactile and proprio-
ceptive events perceived on one’s face and visual events perceived
on the mirror-reflection. These sensory inputs are assimilated in a
pre-existing visual representation of one’s face. In line with
previous studies, the present findings suggest that visual capture of
touch can update representations of one’s physical appearance.
The reported effect provides direct evidence that our body image,
including the representation of one’s face, is not solely derived
from stable representations, but instead these representations are
susceptible to current multisensory evidence. The face is a key
feature of our identity, but at the same time is a source of rich
multisensory experience. Shared multisensory experiences may be
used to maintain or update self-representations and also change
the way we perceive other people.
Materials and Methods
Pre-processing
A digitalphotographofthe participantwastakenina session prior
to the experiment. The participant’s face in the photograph was
mirror transposed, and a black template was used to remove non-
facial attributes (e.g. background, hair, ears) with Adobe Photoshop
CS4. A computerized morphing procedure implementing a mesh
warping algorithm (Abrasoft Fantamorph, www.fantamorph.com)
was used to merge each participant’s face with an unfamiliar face
( s a m es e x ,s a m ea g e +/21 year) in 1% steps, resulting in 100 images
(from 0% selfto100% self, orfrom100% selfto0% self) with graded
blending of the facial features of the two faces.
Experimental Procedure
In the experimental session, participants were first asked to watch
a movie consisting of 100 frames (Pinnacle Studio Software). Each
frame represented a 1% incremental change from one face to
another,from ‘‘0%selfto100%self’’(i.e. ‘‘other toself’’direction) or
from ‘‘100% self to 0% self’’ (i.e. ‘‘self to other’’ direction). For the
movies with ‘‘other to self’’ direction of morphing, participants were
asked to press a key, with their right index finger, as soon as they
perceived the face to look more like ‘‘self’’ than ‘‘other’’. For the
movies with ‘‘self to other’’ direction of morphing, participants were
asked to press the key as soon as they perceived the faceto look more
like ‘‘other’’ than ‘‘self’’. The responses were logged and they served
as a baseline measure of self-face recognition. Participants received
prior training on this task. They watched movies where the image of
Tony Blair was morphed into George Bush or the reverse and they
stopped the movie at the point where the face was more like Blair
than Bush or the reverse.
Following this pre-test, participants were asked to look at the
screen placed in front of them and observe the projected movie. The
movie showed a paintbrush touching a morphed face on the cheek
every 2 sec either in synchrony or asynchrony with respect to the
touch delivered on the participant’s face. Tactile stimulation on the
participant’s face occurred every 2 seconds across both synchronous
and asynchronous conditions. The asynchrony between visual and
tactile stimulation in the asynchronous condition was 1 second.
Therefore, the amount of stimulation across synchronous and
asynchronous stimulation was the same. Each stroke covered a
distance of approximately 2 cm on the face. The morphed face
displayed in the movie contained 50% of the participant’s face and
50% of the face of an unfamiliar person, matched for gender and
age. As soon as the image appeared on the screen, tactile stimulation
was delivered on the participant’s right cheek through an identical
paintbrush. Visuo-tactile stimulation was delivered manually on a
specular congruent location on both faces (see Figure 1b). The
experimenter listened through earphones the audio file of the pre-
recorded movie to pace his tactile stimulation in synchrony or
asynchrony with the metronome that was used to deliver the tactile
stimulation shown in the movie. Thus, while the participant was
looking at a single morphed face, she was being touched on the same
facial location either at the same time (i.e, synchronous visuo-tactile
simulation) or at different time onsets (i.e. asynchronous visuo-tactile
stimulation). Each movie and stimulation period lasted for 120 secs.
At the end of the stimulation period, the morphed image
disappeared, and participants watched again a movie consisting of
the same 100 frames as in pre-test. Participants were asked to stop
the movie as before, depending on the direction of morphing. The
point at which participants stopped the movie represents the effect
of the prior (synchronous or asynchronous) multisensory stimula-
tion on self-face recognition.
In total, each participant performed 8 blocks (4 with synchronous
and 4 with asynchronous visuotactile stimulation). In each block, the
movie in the pre- and post-test displayed the same direction of
morphing (i.e. from ‘‘other to self’’ or the reverse), and participants
performed 4 blocks with each direction of morphing. Each pre- or
post-test movie displayed the same 100 frames, but the duration of
the movie was varied to prevent participants from giving the same
response. Thus, the movies lasted for either 50 sec or 100 sec. The
order of blocks was randomized across participants, and a five
minutes break was interleaved between blocks.
Participants
12 participants with normal vision (8 female, mean age 22.6)
participated in the main study. 6 additional new participants (all
female, mean age 23.8) participated in the control experiment.
Participants were informed that the study was designed to
investigate how shared multisensory experiences affect our
representations of people’s faces, and no specific mention to self-
face recognition was made. During debriefing, participants were
informed that the aim of the study was to investigate how
multisensory input can influence self-face recognition. The study
was approved by the Departmental Ethics Committees, Depart-
ment of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London.
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